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Seeking Pure Fields: The Case Against
Federal Preemption of State Bans on
Genetically Engineered Crops
By LAURA MURPHY, KENNETH NOGA, AND MARK ROSE*

Introduction

O

N NOVEMBER 16, 2013, the Council of the County of Kaua’i,
Hawai’i (“County”) voted to override the Kaua’i mayor’s veto of an
ordinance placing local restrictions on pesticides and genetically modified
organism (GMO) crops.1 Not two months later, Syngenta Seeds, Inc. and
several other producers of GMO crops sued the County in federal district
court.2 These corporations, which produce genetically engineered (GE)
crops, alleged thirteen claims ranging from preemption and equal protection,
to violations of state and county law, and “unconstitutional interference with
the conduct of foreign affairs.”3 Also in 2013, Hawai’i County enacted an
ordinance prohibiting the cultivation of GE crops within the county.4

* Laura Murphy is the Associate Director of the Environmental & Natural Resources Law
Clinic (ENRLC) at Vermont Law School. Kenneth Noga ‘15 and Mark Rose ‘15 are graduates of
Vermont Law School and were student clinicians in the ENRLC. We extend our appreciation to
George Kimbrell, senior attorney at the Center for Food Safety, for his helpful review and
suggestions. We are also grateful for the feedback we received from Ashley Geary LLM ‘14 and
Lori Ann Burd, contract attorney for the Center for Food Safety. In June 2014, the ENRLC
submitted a proposed amicus brief on behalf of farmers and farming groups to the United States
District Court for the District of Hawai’i in the Kaua’i County case described below, Syngenta Seeds
v. County of Kaua’i. The arguments in the brief were substantially similar to many of the points in this
article. Ultimately, the court did not grant the motion for leave to file the amicus brief.
1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 33, Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cnty. of
Kaua’i, No. 14-00014BMK (D. Haw. Jan. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Complaint]; see also Council of the
Cnty. of Kaua’i, Bill No. 2491 (Haw. 2013) [hereinafter Bill No. 2491].
2. See generally Complaint, supra note 1; Jacob Bunge, Ag Firms Sue to Block Anti-GMO Law,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
13,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303819704579316993737808588.
3. Complaint, supra note 1, at 34, 67. On August 25, 2014, the United States District Court
for the District of Hawai’i ruled that Kaua’i County’s law was preempted by state law but not by
federal law. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kauai, No. 14-00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at
*15 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014).
4. HAWAI’I CNTY., HAW., CODE § 14-130 (2005).
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Hawai’i County was sued as well.5
The counties of Kaua’i and Hawai’i joined many other jurisdictions that
have for many years had restrictions on the cultivation of genetically
engineered crops within their borders.6 Many of these are outright bans.7
Though Kaua’i’s ordinance is different in some respects—for example,
requiring disclosure of pesticides and GE crops and establishing buffer
zones—it shares purposes similar to many of these bans, including Hawai’i
County’s. Common themes include concerns about cross-contamination,
human health, and the environment.8
In fact, research and history show that these types of concerns are valid.
In particular, transgenic contamination threatens the preservation and
longevity of local conventional crops, organic crops, and wild populations.
In a 2011 study, for example, researchers identified genetically modified
cotton genes in wild populations in Mexico.9 In another study, researchers
concluded that feral populations of canola were “large and widespread”
based on a roadside survey of canola plants that found two transgenic
varieties growing in the wild, as well as “novel combinations of transgenic
forms.”10 An earlier report by the Union of Concerned Scientists similarly
5. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Hawaii Floriculture & Nursery
Ass’n v. Cnty. of Hawaii, No. 14-00267 BMK (D. Haw. June 9, 2014). The list of plaintiffs in this
suit includes the Biotechnology Industry Organization, also known as “BIO.” About BIO,
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., http://www.bio.org/articles/about-bio (last visited May 4,
2015).
6. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, A NEW VIEW OF U.S. AGRICULTURE: STATE-BY-STATE
FACTSHEETS ON TOP AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, ORGANIC SALES, AND REGULATIONS
ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS 435 (May 2006) [hereinafter A NEW VIEW], available at
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/us_ag_report.pdf. See also ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R3-4901 (2013); HAWAI’I CNTY., HAW., CODE §§ 14-9293 (2008) (applying to coffee and taro); SANTA
CRUZ CNTY., CAL., CODE §§ 7.31.010, 7.31.030 (2006); SAN JUAN CNTY., WASH., CODE §
8.26.030 (2012).
7. SANTA CRUZ CNTY., CAL., CODE §§ 7.31.010, 7.31.030; SAN JUAN CNTY., WASH.,
CODE § 8.26.030; A NEW VIEW, supra note 6, at 435 (explaining that jurisdictions in California,
Colorado, and Maine have some form of all out bans on GE crops and/or fish).
8. See, e.g., Bill No. 2491, supra note 1, §§ 2222.1 (citing concerns about pesticides and
dispersion of GMO plants into the environment); HAWAI’I CNTY., HAW., CODE § 14-128 (2005)
(citing the desire to protect non-GMO crops and plants and preserve Hawai’i Island’s ecosystem);
SANTA CRUZ CNTY., CAL., CODE § 7.31.010 (citing concerns about public health, environmental
safety, and cross-contamination); MENDOCINO CNTY., CAL., CODE § 10A.15.010 (2004) (citing
concerns about “genetic pollution”); MARIN CNTY., CAL., CODE § 6.92.010 (2004) (citing concerns
about long term health and environmental effects and the irreversible danger of contaminating
nearby crops).
9. A. Wegier et al., Recent Long-Distance Transgene Flow Into Wild Populations Conforms to Historical
Patterns of Gene Flow in Cotton (Gossypium Hirsutum) at Its Centre of Origin, 20 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY
4182, 418892 (2011).
10. Meredith G. Schafer et al., The Establishment of Genetically Engineered Canola Populations in the
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found that “[s]eeds of traditional varieties of corn, soybeans, and canola are
pervasively contaminated with low levels of DNA sequences derived from
transgenic varieties.”11
Additionally, many GE crops are designed to tolerate herbicides, which
contributes to the development of “superweeds”12 as well as increased levels
of toxins in the environment that threaten human health and wildlife.13 A
paper from 1992 explained how then-new herbicides intended for herbicideresistant plants “could lead to increased incidence of weeds,” potentially toxic
effects on fish fry, and glyphosate (an herbicide used on GE crops)
accumulation in plant foods.14 A more recent retrospective explained that
“[c]ontrary to often-repeated claims that today’s [GE] crops have, and are
reducing pesticide use, the spread of glyphosate-resistant weeds in herbicideresistant weed management systems has brought about substantial increases
in the number and volume of herbicides applied.”15 GE herbicides have also
been linked to the decline in monarch butterfly populations and, recently, to
the growth of human breast cancer cells.16
As states and localities seek to impose or enforce restrictions on GE
crops arising from concerns such as these, they may be subject to lawsuits
from GE corporations as in Kaua’i and Hawai’i Counties. This Article
addresses one potential aspect of those suits—federal preemption.
Specifically, this Article addresses whether federal law preempts state bans
U.S.,
PLOS
ONE
(Oct.
5,
2011),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0025736.
11. MARGARET MELLON & JANE RISSLER, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, GONE
TO SEED: TRANSGENIC CONTAMINANTS IN THE TRADITIONAL SEED SUPPLY 1 (2004), available
at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/food_and_agriculture/seedreport_fullreport.pdf.
12. “Superweeds” are essentially weeds that have developed resistance to herbicides. See, e.g.,
Marion Nestle, Superweeds: A Long-Predicted Problem for GM Crops Has Arrived, THE ATLANTIC (May
15, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/superweeds-a-long-predictedproblem-for-gm-crops-has-arrived/257187/.
13. Most commercial GE crops are designed to either be resistant to herbicides applied to
the plants, or resistant to pesticides through the use of pesticides incorporated into the plants
themselves. See, e.g., GMO Facts: Frequently Asked Questions, NON-GMO PROJECT,
http://www.nongmoproject.org/learn-more/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
14. Rebecca J. Goldburg, Environmental Concerns with the Development of Herbicide-Tolerant Plants,
6 WEED TECH. 647, 650 (1992).
15. Charles M. Benbrook, Impacts of Genetically Engineered Crops on Pesticide Use in the U.S.—The
First Sixteen Years, ENVTL. SCI. EUR. 1 (2012).
16. See John M. Pleasants & Karen S. Oberhauser, Milkweed Loss in Agricultural Fields Because of
Herbicide Use: Effect on the Monarch Butterfly Population, 6 INSECT CONSERVATION & DIVERSITY 135,
135–36 (2012); Michael Wines, Monarch Migration Plunges to Lowest Level in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/science/earth/monarch-migration-plunges-tolowest-level-in-decades.html; Siriporn Thongprakaisang et al., Glyphosate Induces Human Breast Cancer
Cells Growth via Estrogen Receptors, 59 FOOD & CHEM. TOXICOLOGY 129, 129–30 (2013).
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on planting and growing GE crops.17
In 1986, the Reagan Administration issued a policy (the “Coordinated
Framework”) providing that genetically engineered food and crops should be
regulated under existing laws.18 These laws included what is now the Plant
Protection Act (PPA) administered by the United States Department of
Agriculture, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act administered by the Food and Drug
Administration. This Article discusses the two Acts that address crops as
opposed to food—the PPA and FIFRA.19 As explained below, the PPA is
relevant to the GE crop ban preemption analysis because some PPA
regulations apply to GE organisms. FIFRA is relevant to the GE crop ban
preemption analysis because pesticides genetically engineered to be part of
living plants are subject to FIFRA.
For background, Part I provides a general overview of the preemption
doctrine. Part II provides a description of the regulatory scheme under the
PPA and an analysis of preemption under the PPA. Part III provides a
description of the regulatory scheme under FIFRA and an analysis of
preemption under FIFRA. The Article closes with a brief summary of our
conclusion that the PPA and FIFRA do not preempt well-drafted state laws
banning field-testing or commercial growth of GE crops.

17. The same analysis would apply to federal preemption of local (e.g., municipal) bans.
Unlike state bans, however, local bans might be subject to preemption by state law.
18. See generally Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23302-01 (June 26, 1986) (Announcing of Policy).
19. We do not discuss preemption under the Coordinated Framework because the
Coordinated Framework has no preemptive effect. As a policy document that was never subject to
notice and comment, it cannot carry the force of law and therefore cannot preempt. See, e.g., Fellner
v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 539 F.3d 237, 243–47 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Although federal
administrative law as well as Congressional enactments are the supreme law of the land, we must
reiterate, lest the analysis become unmoored, that it is federal law which preempts contrary state
law; nothing short of federal law can have that effect. . . . We decline to afford preemptive effect to
less formal measures lacking the ‘fairness and deliberation’ which would suggest that Congress
intended the agency’s action to be a binding and exclusive application of federal law. Courts with
good reason are wary of affording preemptive force to actions taken under more informal
circumstances.”). This is especially true for the Coordinated Framework because it was not issued
pursuant to any sort of Congressional delegation of authority that would make it eligible for
deference in the first instance. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)
(“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority.”).
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I. Summary of Preemption Law
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
preempt state law.20 It provides that the laws of the United States “shall be
the supreme Law of the Land.”21 Consistent with the Supremacy Clause,
courts recognize that state laws that conflict with federal law are “‘without
effect.’”22 In this regard, congressional intent may be expressed “through a
statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose.”23 Explicit
statutory language signaling an intent to preempt is known as express
preemption.24 Then, “[i]n the absence of explicit statutory language signaling
intent to preempt, intent can be inferred where Congress has legislated
comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for
the States to supplement federal law.”25 This is recognized as field
preemption. Further, state law that conflicts with federal law will be
preempted if it is impossible to comply with both statutes, or if the state law
acts as a barrier to the attainment and execution of congressional goals.26
In analyzing preemption issues, the U.S. Supreme Court “‘start[s] with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded by . . . [a] Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.’”27 This assumption is particularly strong when
Congress acts in a field that the States traditionally occupy.28 The judicial
analysis of preemption issues is often guided by the maxim that “‘[t]he
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’” in every preemption case.29
Accordingly, a case for preemption will be seen as “particularly weak” where
“Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field
of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts
and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.”30
20. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kansas, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989).
21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
22. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 746 (1981)); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 129 (1824) (“‘In case of
collision . . . the State laws must yield to the superior authority of the United States.’”) (citation
omitted).
23. Altria, 555 U.S. at 76.
24. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516–17 (1992).
25. See Nw. Cent. Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 509 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
26. See id.
27. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
28. Altria, 555 U.S. at 77.
29. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Federal regulations may also have preemptive effect, and courts follow
a similar analysis as for federal statutes.31 The key consideration is whether
the regulating agency intended to preempt state law, and whether that
intention is consistent with congressional intent.32 For field preemption, the
U.S. Supreme Court is “even more reluctant to infer pre-emption from the
comprehensiveness of regulations than from the comprehensiveness of
statutes.”33 Where there is an accusation that state law and federal regulation
conflict, the Court will rely primarily on the substance of state and federal
law and not particularly on agency proclamations of preemption.34

II. The Plant Protection Act and Preemption
A. Overview of PPA Regulatory Scheme
Congress’s primary purpose in enacting the PPA was to protect the
agriculture of the United States from plant pests and noxious weeds.35 The
PPA was passed in 2000, and it incorporated several prior laws including the
Federal Plant Pest Act and the Plant Quarantine Act.36 The PPA grants the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) the authority to regulate
plant pests and noxious weeds.37 The USDA developed the Animal and Plant

31. See, e.g., Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985);
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (citations omitted).
32. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982)
(explaining that judicial review is limited to determining whether there was an intent to preempt
state law, and whether such action was within the agency’s delegated authority). See also Hillsborough,
471 U.S. at 714–15 (noting that, for implied preemption, the agency’s statement that it intends to
preempt is “dispositive” unless the agency’s position is “inconsistent with clearly expressed
congressional intent” or it is subsequently revealed that there is a change in the agency’s position);
Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 699 (“Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal
statutes. . . . When [an agency] administrator promulgates regulations intended to pre-empt state
law, [the court looks to whether the choice] ‘represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, [it should not be disturbed] unless
it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned.’”) (citations omitted).
33. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 717 (“To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a
problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency decides
to step into a field, its regulations will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course, would be inconsistent
with the federal-state balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence.”).
34. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576.
35. See Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).
36. See Plant Pest Regulations; Update of Current Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 51340-41
(proposed Oct. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 330).
37. Plant Protection Act § 7754.
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Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to aid the implementation of the PPA.38
As explained below, the basic function of the PPA and its regulations is to
place restrictions on the introduction of plant pests, noxious weeds, and
regulated articles (which include GE crops).
1. Plant Pests
The PPA regulates the movement of plant pests in interstate commerce
by requiring authorization, either by general or specific permit, for any
importation, entry, exportation, or movement of a plant pest within the
United States or its territories.39 “Movement” of plant pests includes
carrying, entry, importation, transportation, release into the environment, or
any activity that aids in these undertakings.40 “Interstate commerce” is trade,
traffic, or other commerce between states or within United States
territories.41 The Secretary of Agriculture has authority to issue regulations
to prevent the introduction or dissemination of plant pests in the United
States.42
The Secretary may make an exception to the permit requirement under
certain conditions.43 Further, a person may petition the Secretary to exempt
a plant pest from regulation so a permit is no longer required for its
movement and introduction.44 For the purposes of the statute, the term
“person” includes any individual or corporation.45
The PPA defines a “plant pest” as the following:
[A]ny living stage of any of the following that can directly or indirectly
injure, cause damage to, or cause disease in any plant or plant product:
(A) A protozoan. (B) A nonhuman animal. (C) A parasitic plant. (D) A
bacterium. (E) A fungus. (F) A virus or viroid. (G) An infectious agent or
other pathogen. (H) Any article similar to or allied with any of the articles
specified in the preceding subparagraphs. 46

The regulations largely mirror this definition and include “any
processed, manufactured, or other products of plants” as things that may be

38. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 2.22(a)(2), 2.80 (2014).
39. Plant Protection Act § 7711(a).
40. See id. § 7702(9).
41. Id. § 7702(7).
42. Id. § 7711(a).
43. Id. § 7711(c)(1).
44. Id. § 7711(c)(2)–(3) (noting that the Secretary’s determination on the petition shall be
based on “sound science”).
45. Id. § 7702(12) (“The term ‘person’ means any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, joint venture, or other legal entity.”).
46. Id. § 7702(14).
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injured by plant pests.47 Organisms that “are or contain” plant pests—if they
otherwise meet the definition—are listed in 7 C.F.R. § 340.2, and they
include genus Agrobacterium.48 Examples of plant pests include the Asian
Longhorned Beetle, Emerald Ash Borer, and Golden Nematode.49
Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a), the USDA has enacted regulations
providing that a “regulated article” may not be “introduced” without APHIS
approval.50 This means that a person must have approval to move a
regulated article interstate or “into or through the United States.”51 Also, a
person may not release into the environment a regulated article without
approval; environment in this case includes “all the land, air, and water,” as
well as “all living organisms in association with land, air and water.”52
Regulated articles are most commonly introduced through either “field tests”
or “field trials” for experimental purposes.53 The procedure for introduction
is outlined under 7 C.F.R. § 340.0:
No person shall introduce any regulated article unless the Administrator
is: (1) Notified of the introduction in accordance with § 340.3, or such
introduction is authorized by permit in accordance with § 340.4, or such
introduction is conditionally exempt from permit requirements under §
340.2(b); and (2) Such introduction is in conformity with all other
applicable restrictions in this part. 54

Thus, regulated articles not exempt under 7 C.F.R. § 340.2(b) are
subject to either the permitting requirements of 7 C.F.R. § 340.4 or the
notification procedures under 7 C.F.R. § 340.3.
a. Defining Regulated Articles

Genetically modified organisms, including some genetically engineered
crops, are specifically addressed in APHIS regulations through the definition

47. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2014).
48. Id. § 340.2. See also id. n.4 (noting that the organisms contained in § 340.2 are only
considered to be a plant pest if they can damage plants, their parts, or any plant products).
Agrobacterium tumefaciens is “[a] genus of bacteria that researchers can use to transfer DNA to
plants.” Glossary, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/glossary.aspx (last
visited May 4, 2015).
49. Plant
Pests
and
Diseases
Programs,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
AGRIC.,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/planthealth/sa_domestic_pests_and_dis
eases/sa_pests_and_diseases/!ut/p/a0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOK9_D2MDJ0Mj
Dzd3V2dDDz93HwCzL29jAx8TfULsh0VAY_1WkE!/ (last visited May 4, 2015).
50. 7 C.F.R § 340.0 (2014).
51. Id. § 340.1 (defining interstate).
52. Id. (defining environment).
53. See id. §§ 340.3(c)(5)–(6), 340.4(f)(9), 340.6(c)(5).
54. Id. § 340.0.
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of a “regulated article.” 55
A regulated article is an organism that has been altered or produced
through genetic engineering from an organism that (1) is listed in § 340.2 and
meets the definition of a plant pest; (2) is an unclassified organism or the
classification is unknown; (3) is a product that contains such an organism
(described in (1)); or (4) is a product or organism produced or altered through
genetic engineering that the agency determines is a plant pest or has reason
to believe is a plant pest.56
In practice, APHIS presumes that organisms that are genetically
modified through the use of plant pests are themselves plant pests.57 These
organisms are recognized as “presumptive plant pests” and retain this
designation until APHIS concludes that the organism is not, in fact, a plant
pest.58 The definition of “presumptive plant pest,” however, does not appear
in the regulations. And, there is no further regulatory guidance for how the
Secretary comes to have “reason to believe” that a genetically modified
organism is a plant pest. APHIS has stated that “[u]nder the current
regulations, there is no explicit statement of the relative responsibilities of the
Administrator and regulated parties in determining whether an organism
met the definition for a regulated article and, therefore, would be subject to
the regulations.”59
Additionally, APHIS may treat a GE crop as a regulated article even if
a plant pest is not used in the engineering process. In the case of DAS-402789 corn, APHIS treated the crop as a regulated article even though it was not
engineered with biological materials from any designated plant pests.60
55. Id. § 340.1 (“Any organism which has been altered or produced through genetic
engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or vector or vector agent belongs to any
genera or taxa designated in 340.2 and meets the definition of plant pest, or is an unclassified
organism and/or an organism whose classification is unknown, or any product which contains such
an organism, or any other organism or product altered or produced through genetic engineering
which the Administrator determines is a plant pest or has reason to believe is a plant pest. Excluded
are recipient microorganisms which are not plant pests and which have resulted from the addition
of genetic material from a donor organism where the material is well characterized and contains
only non-coding regulatory regions.”).
56. Id.
57. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2013); see also 7 C.F.R. §
340.1 (2014) (defining regulated article to include genetically engineered plants that are engineered
with plant pests).
58. See Vilsack, 718 F.3d at 835; see also 7 C.F.R § 340.6 (2014).
59. Importation, Interstate Movement, and Release Into the Environment of Certain
Genetically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 60008, 60011 (proposed Oct. 9, 2008) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 340).
60. See ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., PLANT PEST RISK ASSESSMENT
FOR
DAS-40278-9
CORN
7
(2010),
available
at
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Despite DAS-40278-9 corn not containing genetic material from a plant
pest, APHIS likely chose to designate it as a regulated article because it did
not have the information necessary to determine if the corn posed a plant
pest risk.61 In the course of the deregulation procedure, the agency examined
a number of factors to determine if the presumed plant pest corn was in fact
a plant pest or was alternatively safe for deregulation.62 Thus, despite the illdefined nature of what APHIS “has reason to believe is a plant pest,” genetic
modification is the common denominator.
b. Notification and Permitting Requirements for the Introduction
of a Regulated Article

As noted above, a regulated article must go through a permitting or
notification procedure prior to introduction (unless exempt). APHIS’s
notification procedure requires an entity to submit information thirty days
prior to the proposed environmental release of a regulated article.63 Upon
receipt of a notification, APHIS evaluates a proposed release based on six
requirements regarding the risks a given regulated article may pose.64 Among
other things, these requirements specify that the regulated article may not be
a noxious weed, the new genetic material must be “stably integrated” in the
genome, and the genetic material must not be known to cause plant disease
or produce an infectious entity or toxicity in nontarget plants.65 If APHIS
determines a regulated article is safe for introduction, the article must
continue to meet certain performance standards subsequent to its
introduction during field-testing. These standards include that the regulated
articles “be planted in such a way that they are not inadvertently mixed with
non-regulated plant materials of any species which are not part of the
environmental release” and that “[n]o offspring can be produced that could
persist in the environment” during the course of field-testing. 66
Any person who cannot meet the notification standards must apply for
a permit in order to introduce a regulated article.67 The permit application
requires the applicant to disclose characteristics of the regulated article and

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/09_23301p_dpra.pdf (“No plant pest or plant pestderived material was used to generate the DAS-40278-9 corn plants”).
61. See id. at 6–7.
62. Id.
63. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(d)(3)(iii) (2014).
64. See id. § 340.3(b).
65. See 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(b)(1)–(3) (2015).
66. Id. §§ 340.3(c)(2), 340.3(c)(3)(ii).
67. See id. § 340.4 (detailing the permit application requirements and procedures).
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a plan for containment, among other things.68 Alternatively, a person may
request what is known as a “courtesy permit.” A courtesy permit helps
“facilitate movement” of non-regulated GMOs if their movement “might
otherwise be impeded” based on similarity to regulated GMOs.69 A courtesy
permit only requires a sixty-day review period as compared to the 120-day
review period that follows the traditional permit.70
The introduction of regulated articles most often follows the notification
procedure set out in 7 C.F.R. § 340.3 as opposed to the lengthier and more
rigorous permitting procedure of § 340.4.71 Under notification, APHIS
decides within thirty days if environmental release of a regulated article is
appropriate, whereas a permit requires a 120-day review period that can be
extended if APHIS determines an environmental impact statement is
necessary.72 Further, notification requires less detail about the molecular and
genetic makeup of the regulated article to receive approval for environmental
release.73
c. Petition for Determination of Nonregulated Status

A person may petition APHIS to grant “nonregulated status” to a
regulated article so the article no longer falls within APHIS’s regulatory
authority (absent a reassertion of authority by APHIS).74 For example,
APHIS has deregulated certain strains of genetically engineered cotton, corn,
soybeans, and alfalfa, allowing these crops to be planted without further
oversight.75 The petition for deregulation must present a “full statement
explaining the factual grounds” as to why the organism should not be
regulated, including why the organism does not pose a greater plant pest risk
than its non-GMO counterpart.76 These include descriptions of the nonmodified plants, regulated articles, and experimental data.77 Additionally,
field test reports for all trials conducted under permit or notification
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. § 340.4(b)(1)–(14).
Id. § 340.4(h)(1).
Id. § 340.4(b)(h)(2); id. § 340.4(b).
See DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, CONTAMINATING THE WILD? GENE FLOW FROM
EXPERIMENTAL FIELD TRIALS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS TO RELATED WILD
PLANTS 10 (2006) (noting that in the period between 20002005, 97% of all field test approvals
were by notification).
72. 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.3(e)(4) (2014); id. § 340.4(b).
73. Compare § 340.3(d), with § 340.4(b).
74. See 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(a).
75. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2013).
76. 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.6(b)–(c) (2014).
77. Id. § 340.6(c)(1)–(4).
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procedures involving regulated articles must be submitted.78 Based on this
information, APHIS decides to approve or deny the petition, in whole or in
part.79
2. Noxious Weeds
The PPA defines “noxious weed” as the following:
[A]ny plant or plant product that can directly or indirectly injure or cause
damage to crops (including nursery stock or plant products), livestock,
poultry, or other interests of agriculture, irrigation, navigation, the
natural resources of the United States, the public health, or the
environment.80

Examples of noxious weeds include killer algae and lightning weed.81
In a similar fashion to plant pests, the PPA empowers the Secretary to
“prohibit or restrict” the movement of noxious weeds, if necessary, to prevent
their introduction or dissemination within the United States.82 The Secretary
may issue regulations to achieve this goal by requiring permits or certificates
of inspection, or by requiring “remedial measures” designed to prevent the
proliferation of noxious weeds.83 Further, the Secretary of Agriculture may
“publish, by regulation, a list of noxious weeds that are prohibited or
restricted from entering the United States or that are subject to restrictions
on interstate movement within the United States.”84 Pursuant to this
provision, the list of prohibited and restricted noxious weeds is located under
7 C.F.R. § 360.200. Also, a person may petition the Secretary to add or
remove identified noxious weeds from a regulation promulgated by the
Secretary.85
As with plant pests, federal regulations restrict the movement of noxious
weeds.86 A person may not move a noxious weed in interstate commerce
78. Id. § 349.6(c)(5).
79. Id. § 340.6(d)(3)(i)–(ii).
80. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7702(10) (2012).
81. 7 C.F.R. § 360.200(a) (2014); id. § 360.200(c).
82. Plant Protection Act § 7712(a).
83. Id. § 7712(c)(3).
84. Id. § 7712(f)(1).
85. Id. § 7712(f)(2); see also 7 C.F.R. § 360.500 (2014) (explaining the petition process to add a
taxon to the noxious weed list); id. § 360.501 (explaining the petition process to remove a taxon from
the noxious weed list).
86. 7 C.F.R. § 360.300 (2014). Though the current regulations in 7 C.F.R. pt. 340 (governing
GE organisms which are or may be plant pests) are specific to plant pests, APHIS has proposed
regulations that would explicitly include noxious weed considerations in the permitting and
introduction process for GE organisms. See Importation, Interstate Movement, and Release Into
the Environment of Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,008, 60,011
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unless (s)he has first obtained a permit.87 Applications for a permit must be
submitted to the Deputy Administrator and must include information about
the origin, quantity, and intended use of the noxious weed, as well as the
proposed method of shipment.88 Permits are granted if the movement of the
noxious weed is determined to not involve danger of dissemination or will be
issued subject to conditions mitigating any such danger.89

B. PPA Express Preemption Analysis
Congressional intent to withhold state authority is most clearly
evidenced by the inclusion of express preemption clauses in statutory text.
Congress may withdraw specified powers from the states by enacting statutes
containing express preemption provisions.90 Addressing the issue of express
preemption, the U.S. Supreme Court noted, “[W]hen Congress has made its
intent known through explicit statutory language, the court’s task is an easy
one.”91 However, there may still be interpretive difficulties, as noted later by
the Court: “If a federal law contains an express preemption clause, it does
not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and
scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still remains.”92 Therefore,
express preemption clauses do not automatically foreclose state authority,
but rather act as catalysts for determining what and how much state authority
is displaced.
Courts generally disfavor the displacement of large swaths of state
authority in express preemption clauses. When an express preemption clause
is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, courts ordinarily
“‘accept the reading that disfavors preemption.’”93 When interpreting the
scope and meaning of an express preemption clause, a court “begin[s] with
the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary

(proposed Oct. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 340) (“Although the current program has
been effective in ensuring the safe environmental release, interstate movement, and importation of
genetically engineered organisms, technological advances have led to the possibility of developing
GE organisms that do not fit within the plant pest definition, but may cause environmental or other
types of physical harm or damage covered by the definition of noxious weed in the PPA. Therefore,
we consider that it is appropriate to align the regulations with both the plant pest and noxious weed
authorities of the PPA.”).
87. 7 C.F.R. § 360.300(a)–(b)(2014).
88. Id. § 360.301(b)(4), (6), (9), (11).
89. See id. §§ 360.302(a), 360.303.
90. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012).
91. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
92. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
93. Id. at 77 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)).
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meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”94
Under this interpretive scheme, little latitude is given for the dislocation of
state law outside of what is articulated in the preemption clause itself.
The PPA defines state authority to regulate plant pests and noxious
weeds in both foreign and interstate commerce through an express
preemption section.95 The first part of the express preemption section
provides that a state or political subdivision of a state is expressly prohibited
from regulating a plant pest or noxious weed in foreign commerce “in
order—(1) to control a plant pest or noxious weed; (2) to eradicate a plant
pest or noxious weed; or (3) prevent the introduction or dissemination of a
biological control organism, plant pest, or noxious weed.”96 For the purposes
of this analysis, this Article assumes that a local ban on the planting of
genetically engineered crops would lie outside the reach of foreign trade and
traffic because it would not regulate the import or export of GE goods.97
The second part of the PPA’s preemption section applies to interstate
commerce:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may regulate the movement
in interstate commerce of any article, means of conveyance, plant,
biological control organism, plant pest, noxious weed, or plant product in
order to control a plant pest or noxious weed, eradicate a plant pest or
noxious weed, or prevent the introduction or dissemination of a biological
control organism, plant pest, or noxious weed, if the Secretary has issued
a regulation or order to prevent the dissemination of the biological
control organism, plant pest, or noxious weed within the United States. 98

Therefore, in order for a state regulation to be preempted, it must (1)
regulate a plant or other listed item in interstate commerce; (2) regulate said
item in order to someway control a plant pest or noxious weed; and (3) the
Secretary must have issued a regulation or order to prevent the dissemination
of the plant pest or noxious weed.
There are two exceptions to the PPA’s preemption provision. First, the
PPA exempts state regulations from preemption if they are consistent with

94. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 532 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
95. See Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 7756(a)(b) (2012).
96. Id. § 7756(a).
97. If a state ban on the planting of GE crops were found to regulate in foreign commerce,
the preemption issue would follow the same analysis of plant pests and noxious weeds as provided
for in the following discussion of interstate commerce under clauses 1 and 2.
98. Plant Protection Act § 7756(b). The PPA defines “state” to include the states of the United
States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other territories or possessions of the United
States. Id. § 7702(17).
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and do not go beyond APHIS regulations or orders.99 Second, state
regulation is exempt from preemption if a state successfully demonstrates that
there is a “special need” for additional requirements based on a risk analysis
or scientific information.100 According to a recent article, “the USDA has
never approved a state request due to the language of the Act and a restrictive
agency interpretation.”101 Therefore, a special need request would likely
need to be well-supported and account for the USDA’s history with these
requests.
All three requirements of the PPA’s preemption section must be satisfied
in order for a state law to be expressly preempted. This Article will discuss
each of them in turn.
1. Clause 1: Whether the Law Regulates the Movement of a
“Plant” or Other Listed Item in “Interstate Commerce”
If a state regulation does not regulate a “plant” or other listed item in
“interstate commerce,” then it is not preempted.102 Because the PPA’s
definition of “plant” includes any plant parts capable of propagation,
including seeds,103 this Article assumes that a state ban on planting
genetically engineered crops would implicate “plants” as contemplated by
the PPA.
The PPA’s definition of interstate commerce is “trade, traffic, or other
commerce” between the following:
(A) a place in a State and a point in another State, or between points
within the same State but through any place outside the State; or
(B) within the District of Columbia, Guam, the Virgin Islands of the
United States, or any other territory or possession of the United States. 104

Based on the plain language of the statute, a ban on the cultivation of
GE crops does not fall under the rubric of interstate commerce as defined in
the PPA for two reasons.
First, though they may affect interstate commerce, the acts of planting
and growing crops are not themselves in commerce because they are not

99. Plant Protection Act § 7756(b)(2)(A).
100. Id. § 7756(b)(2)(B).
101. Read D. Porter & Nina C. Robertson, Tracking Implementation of the Special Need Request
Process Under the Plant Protection Act, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11000, 11000 (2011).
102. As noted above, the statute’s definition of “movement” includes “release into the
environment,” which means the release of a regulated article outside some sort of contained
structure. Plant Protection Act § 7702(9).
103. Id. § 7702(13).
104. Id. § 7702(7).
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“trade, traffic, or other commerce.”105 They are not an “interchange,”
“exchange,” or “transportation” of goods (the ordinary meanings of
“commerce,” “trade,” and “traffic”).106 The PPA recognizes this distinction
between being in interstate commerce and affecting interstate commerce in
its “Findings” section, which states that all items regulated under the PPA
“are in or affect interstate commerce” (not necessarily both).107 Therefore, a
state ban on the growth of genetically engineered crops does not fall under
the very first requirement for preemption. Though this Article discusses the
other sections of the PPA’s preemption provision in the pages that follow, a
court need not look further than the definition of “commerce.”
Second, though a state ban on growing GE crops may affect interstate
commerce, it would not actually regulate activities that are “interstate” as
defined by the PPA. A ban would apply to the planting and growth of GE
crops intrastate and would be bounded by the state’s borders. Thus, it would
not regulate activities that occur between “a place in a State and a point in
another State” or through “any place outside the State.”108
2. Clause 2: Whether a State Has Passed a Regulation “In Order
To” Control, Eradicate, or Prevent the Introduction or
Dissemination of a Plant Pest or Noxious Weed
a. If an Item Is Not a Plant Pest or Noxious Weed, Regulation of
That Item Is Not Preempted

If a state regulates an item that is not a plant pest or noxious weed,
regulation of that item is not preempted. This is a necessary, but not
sufficient, prerequisite to a finding of express preemption under the PPA. Put
another way, a state regulation must be aimed at “a plant pest or noxious
weed” in order to satisfy this clause. If the state regulation is aimed at
something other than an actual plant pest or noxious weed, then this clause
is not satisfied.109 A 2011 tort action against the GE rice company Bayer for
105. Id.
106. See
Commerce
Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/commerce?s=t (last visited Aug. 12, 2015) (“an
interchange of goods or commodities . . . .”); Trade Definition, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/trade?s=t (last visited Aug. 12, 2015) (“the act or process
of buying, selling, or exchanging commodities . . . .”); Traffic Definition, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/traffic?s=t (last visited Aug. 12, 2015) (“the
transportation of goods for the purpose of trade . . . .”).
107. Plant Protection Act § 7701(9) (emphasis added).
108. Id. § 7702(7)(A).
109. See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 2011 WL 339168, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 1, 2011).
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contaminating rice supplies with experimental genetically engineered rice
illustrates this point. In that case, a federal court in Missouri held that “[t]he
Plant Protection Act does not preempt plaintiffs’ claims in this case because
plaintiffs’ claims do not attempt to regulate material ‘in foreign commerce’
and because Bayer has not shown that its genetically modified rice constitutes
a ‘plant pest’ under the statute.”110 This means that, even though the
experimental rice would have been a regulated article, the court found that
preemption was not possible unless the rice were an actual plant pest.
Under this reading, state regulation of several categories of GE plants
(including seeds and crops) are not preempted: regulated articles that are not
plant pests; former regulated articles that have been deregulated because
they are not plant pests; and any other items that are not actually plant pests.
Similarly, if a GE plant is not specifically listed as a noxious weed in the
regulations, then regulation of that item is not preempted pursuant to the
noxious weed portion of this clause. APHIS only regulates the organisms it
has listed as noxious weeds under 7 C.F.R. § 360.200.111 Thus, if a state ban
applies to GE crops not listed as noxious weeds in § 360.200, this clause of
the PPA preemption provision cannot be satisfied, and there will be no
preemption with regard to noxious weeds.
The federal regulations regarding the special needs exception to the
preemption provision support this interpretation. The regulations specifically
refer to “plant pests,” “noxious weeds,” and “biological control organisms”
as the subjects of any request, which suggests that the express preemption
provision could only apply to actual, previously identified “plant pests,”
“noxious weeds,” and “biological control organisms” in the first instance.112
Thus, if a state ban on the cultivation of GE crops does not apply to
organisms that are recognized as plant pests or noxious weeds, the state ban
cannot be preempted.113

110. Id.
111. See 7 C.F.R. § 360.200 (2014) (listing plants APHIS has determined to be noxious weeds).
A case from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia noted that if APHIS had granted
a petition to list Kentucky bluegrass as a noxious weed, APHIS would have been able to “prohibit
or restrict movement of these plants to prevent their introduction into the United States and their
use in interstate commerce”—implying that, if the plant is not so listed, APHIS has no authority
over it. Int’l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2007).
112. See 7 C.F.R. § 301.1-2(a)(1)–(5) (2014).
113. Unlike the plant pest regulations, the noxious weeds regulations have a preemption
provision. See id. § 360.600(a). This preemption provision does not include “in order to” language.
Instead it simply explains that states may not “impose prohibitions or restrictions upon the
movement in interstate commerce of . . . noxious weeds . . . .” Id. However, as discussed in Part I,
any preemption by regulation must be consistent with congressional intent. Therefore, to the extent
this provision is inconsistent with the PPA, it cannot preempt. The same would hold true for other
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b. If a State Law Was Not Passed “In Order To” Control,
Eradicate, or Prevent the Introduction or Dissemination of
Plant Pests or Noxious Weeds, That Law Is Not Preempted

Even if a state law regulated actual plant pests or noxious weeds, it
would only satisfy this prong of the PPA’s preemption test if the law was
passed to control, eradicate, or prevent the dissemination of the plants
because they are plant pests or noxious weeds. When interpreting the
meaning of a statute, “[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive,
except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’”114
In this instance, the plain meaning of the phrase, “in order to,” should be
read to mean that a state law must be enacted for the purpose of regulating
plants or other articles because they are plant pests or noxious weeds. If, on
the other hand, a state law were passed to regulate plants or other articles
(which happen to be plant pests or noxious weeds) because they are
genetically engineered, this clause would not be satisfied. Rather than passing
a law in order to control, eradicate, and prevent a plant pest or noxious weed,
the state would be passing a law to control, eradicate, and prevent GE crops,
regardless of those crops’ plant pest or noxious weed status. A 2004 Pew
Report also made this point, stating, “Express preemption under the
Supremacy Clause does not operate here because the PPA’s preemption
provision only preempts state regulation for plant pest and noxious weed
control purposes; it does not address the preemption status of state actions to
address broader environmental, economic, or social concerns.”115

agency statements regarding preemption, e.g., the Federal Register provision noting that state and
local law that is “inconsistent” with the regulations will be preempted. See Genetically Engineered
Organisms and Products; Simplification of Requirements and Procedures for Genetically
Engineered Organisms, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,945, 23,956 (May 2, 1997) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt.
340).
114. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
115. MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL., TENDING THE FIELDS: STATE & FEDERAL ROLES IN THE
OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS
122 (2004),
available at
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-RPT-TendingtheFields.pdf. We also note that APHIS
and the GE industry would be hard-pressed to argue that a genetically engineered crop ban was
passed “in order to” control a plant pest or noxious weed. This is because, in the recent Vilsack case
decided in the Ninth Circuit, both APHIS and Monsanto argued that harms such as increased
herbicide use and cross-contamination were not plant pest harms, and the Court agreed. Ctr. for
Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 839–41 (9th Cir. 2013); Brief of Federal Appellees at 28–30,
Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-15052) [hereinafter USDA
Brief]; Intervenor-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 30–36, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d
829 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-15052). APHIS has made similar statements in the noxious weed
context. See, e.g., Importation, Interstate Movement, and Release Into the Environment of Certain
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The fact that states and other localities have already regulated GE crops
more stringently than APHIS also supports the conclusion that laws passed
for a purpose other than eradicating or otherwise controlling plants because
they are plant pests or noxious weeds, are not preempted.
In Minnesota, for example, the Genetically Engineered Organisms Act
gives Minnesota’s Commissioner of Agriculture the power to require, impose
conditions on, and deny permits for the planting of GE crops.116 This law
established a permitting system for proposed releases of GE organisms “to
protect humans and the environment from the potential for significant
adverse effects of those releases.”117
In Arizona, a regulation authorizes the Arizona Department of
Agriculture to place restrictions on—or deny—the granting of a permit for
GE crop cultivation, “in addition to USDA’s requirements.”118 Specifically,
permit applicants must demonstrate various safeguards to the state, and the
state may require additional conditions or deny a permit if necessary.119 In
this way, Arizona’s requirements might be in addition to, and more stringent
than, any restrictions APHIS provides.120
Additionally, several localities in California have more stringent
requirements than the federal law when it comes to GE crops. In Mendocino
County, it is unlawful to “propagate, cultivate, raise, or grow genetically
modified organisms” in the county.121 This ordinance was passed to “protect
the County’s agriculture, environment, economy, and private property from
genetic pollution by genetically modified organisms.”122 Similarly, Marin
County makes it unlawful to “propagate, cultivate, raise, or grow genetically

Genetically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,008, 60,014 (proposed Oct. 9, 2008) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 340) (discussing whether noxious weed pose a physical threat); U.S. DEP’T
OF AGRIC. & ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., REVIEW OF PETITION TO ADD
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED GLYPHOSATE-TOLERANT KENTUCKY BLUEGRASS TO THE
FEDERAL
NOXIOUS
WEED
REGULATION
12
(2011),
available
at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant_health/plant_pest_info/weeds/downloads/KentuckyBG/KY-BG-FNW-PetitionReview.pdf. While we do not endorse the court’s opinion or APHIS’
position, it would provide an additional—but not necessary—means to avoid preemption. The
argument would be that, if a state law is not passed in order to address plant pest or noxious weed
harms, then it is not passed in order to control a plant pest or noxious weed.
116. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 18F.02, 18F.04, 18F.07 (West 2015).
117. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 18F.01 (West 2015).
118. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R3-4-901 (2013).
119. Id.
120. Id. (noting that on top of the USDA’s requirements, permit applicants must demonstrate
various other safeguards to State, and State may require additional conditions or deny permit).
121. MENDOCINO CNTY., CAL., CODE § 10A.15.020 (2004).
122. Id.
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modified organisms” in the county.123 The ordinance has a fairly substantial
findings and purpose section, beginning with “[t]he people of the county of
Marin, desiring to protect our agricultural industry, our natural
environment, the private property rights of our citizens, and the health, safety
and welfare of our people, deem it advisable and appropriate to restrict the
cultivation of genetically modified crops, livestock, and other organisms in
our county.”124 Trinity and Santa Cruz, California, as well as San Juan,
Washington, also prohibit the cultivation of GE crops for similar reasons.125
3. Clause 3: Whether the Secretary Has “Issued a Regulation or
Order” to Prevent the Dissemination of the Plant Pest or
Noxious Weed
The final clause of the preemption provision requires that, in order for
a state law to be preempted, the Secretary must have issued a regulation or
order to prevent the dissemination of the plant pest or noxious weed.126 Like
the earlier clauses, this is a necessary, but not a sufficient, prerequisite to a
finding of preemption.
Two key considerations under this clause are (1) whether APHIS has
issued a regulation or order regarding “the” plant pest or noxious weed in
the first instance; and (2) whether any order or regulation issued by APHIS
was for the purpose of “preventing” the dissemination of the subject article.
First, because Congress used the word “the” before “plant pest or
noxious weed,” and used “plant pest” and “noxious weed” in the singular, a
federal regulation or order cannot have preemptive effect unless it applies to
the particular plant pest or noxious weed at issue in a state law. In other words,
a general regulation or order that applies to all plant pests or noxious weeds
would not have preemptive effect.127 Therefore, it is only plant-specific

123. MARIN CNTY., CAL., CODE § 6.92.020 (2004).
124. Id. § 6.92.010.
125. See TRINITY CNTY., CAL., CODE §§ 8.25.020, 8.25.030 (2004); SANTA CRUZ CNTY.,
CAL., CODE §§ 7.31.010, 7.31.030 (2006); SAN JUAN CNTY., WASH., CODE § 8.26.030 (2012).
126. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(1) (2012).
127. The Preamble to APHIS’ 1993 rule on notification procedures for regulated articles states
that “[i]t is APHIS’ position that where the Secretary of Agriculture has established an interstate
quarantine or regulation under either Act, neither the States nor Territories can establish additional
requirements concerning the particular subject matter regulated thereby.” Genetically Engineered
Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Article
and Petition for Nonregulated Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,044, 17,053 (Mar. 31, 1993) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 340). The reference to “particular subject matter” supports the view that it is only
plant-specific regulations or orders that could potentially have preemptive effect.
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orders or regulations such as quarantines that could satisfy this element.128
Further, in order to have preemptive effect, any regulation or order issued
by the Secretary would need to apply to an actual plant pest or noxious weed
by the statute’s plain terms (“if the Secretary has issued a regulation or order
to prevent the dissemination of . . . the plant pest or noxious weed”).129
Second, even if APHIS issues a plant-specific regulation or order
regarding an actual plant pest or noxious weed, the purpose of the regulation
or order must be to “prevent” the dissemination of the subject article in order
for preemption to apply. Though APHIS has sometimes stated that a given
set of regulations was issued for this purpose,130 in actuality, the plant pest
regulations applicable to GE crops are generally aimed at controlling the
introduction of plant pests, rather than preventing their dissemination.131 In fact, the
function of the plant pest regulations is to allow GE regulated articles to be
“release[d] into the environment” through field tests.132
A recent article advanced this view of what it means for an order or
regulation to “prevent” the dissemination of a plant pest or noxious weed,

128. See generally 7 C.F.R. §§ 301.1–301.92-12 (2014) (discussing quarantine procedures
applicable to black stem rust, the Japanese beetle, and the South American cactus moth among
others).
129. Plant Protection Act § 7756(b)(1) (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Plant Pest Regulations; Update of Current Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,340
(proposed Oct. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 330) (“The purpose of the regulations in
‘Subpart—Movement of Plant Pests’ (7 CFR 330.200 through 330.212) is to prevent the
dissemination of plant pests into the United States, or interstate, by regulating the importation and
interstate movement of plant pests.”); Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced
Through Genetic Engineering Which Are Plant Pests or Which There is Reason to Believe Are
Plant Pests Regulated Articles, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,892, 22,892 (June 16, 1987) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 330, 340) (“These regulations are necessary to prevent the entry into and dissemination
and establishment of plant pests in the United States.”); 7 C.F.R. § 360.200 (2014) (“[I]t is necessary
to designate the following plants as noxious weeds to prevent their introduction into the United
States or their dissemination within the United States.”). The permitting regulations for noxious
weeds and plant pests reflect similar ideas. See 7 C.F.R. § 360.303 (2014) (allowing noxious weed
permits to be issued with conditions necessary to prevent the proliferation of that noxious weed); id.
§ 340.4(f) (“A person who is issued a permit . . . shall comply with the following conditions . . . as
deemed by the Administrator to be necessary to prevent the dissemination and establishment of
plant pests.”).
131. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.0, 340.3, 340.4 (2014) (governing the “introduction” of regulated
articles through permitting and notification); see also APHIS Policy on Responding to Low-Level
Presence of Genetically Engineered Plant Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,649, 14,649 (Mar. 29, 2007)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 340) (“This permitting and notification system is designed to restrict
introductions of GE plants and plant materials as long as they are regulated by the Agency.”) (emphasis
added).
132. See 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2014) (defining “introduction” to include “release into the
environment”); id. § 340.3 (establishing notification procedure for introduction of regulated articles);
id. § 340.4 (establishing permitting program for introduction of regulated articles).
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pointing out the difference between the language in the first and second parts
of the preemption provision.133 Basically, the provision states that in order to
be preemptive, the Secretary’s regulation or order must be issued for the sole
purpose of preventing the dissemination of a plant pest or noxious weed. In
contrast, the first part of the preemption provision provides that states cannot
control, eradicate, or prevent the introduction or dissemination of a plant pest or
noxious weed under certain circumstances. Therefore, Congress
contemplated a distinction between “preventing” the dissemination and
“controlling,” “eradicating,” or preventing the “introduction” of plant pests
and noxious weeds. Thus, the list of state actions that could potentially be
preempted (e.g., control, eradicate, prevent the introduction) is more
extensive than the list of APHIS actions that could have preemptive effect
(prevent the dissemination). Any action by the federal government merely to
control, eradicate, or prevent the introduction of a plant pest would not have
preemptive effect:
The PPA appears to limit the types of APHIS actions that result in
preemption. Preemption applies only when APHIS has acted to prevent
the dissemination of the . . . plant pest . . . within the United States.
APHIS action to prevent dissemination of a pest preempts four types of
state actions, including action to: control; eradicate; prevent the
introduction of; or prevent the dissemination of [a plant pest].
Thus, the list of state actions preempted is more extensive than the list
of actions that have preemptive effect. While there is little legal precedent
interpreting this provision, the distinction between the types of actions
appears to be intentional, such that federal action to control, eradicate,
or prevent the introduction of a pest would not preempt state action. 134

Further, special need requests135 have only ever been sought where
there was a federal quarantine in place.136 This suggests that a state’s
potential need to obtain permission to regulate in excess of APHIS could only
arise where APHIS has actually instituted a plant pest or noxious weedspecific quarantine. The preemption provision of the domestic quarantine
regulations also supports this view and actually describes APHIS actions that
would have preemptive effect as “the prohibitions or restrictions imposed by
this part or by a Federal Order.”137 “[T]his part” refers to “Part 301—
133. See Porter & Robertson, supra note 101, at 11014.
134. Id. at 11014 (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Update of Noxious Weed
Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg. 27,456, 27,457 (proposed June 10, 2009) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts.
319, 352, 360, 361) (“[T]he PPA grants the Administration the authority to take action to prevent
the introduction of a noxious weed into the United States as well as to prevent the dissemination of
a noxious weed within the United States.”) (emphasis added).
135. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
136. See Porter & Robertson, supra note 101, at 11000.
137. 7 C.F.R. § 301.1(b) (2014).
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Domestic Quarantine Notices”—meaning that any other quarantines, much
less non-quarantine prohibitions or restrictions, would not have preemptive
effect. Additionally, APHIS has referred to its authority to “prevent the
dissemination of a plant pest” as the authority to “take or order remedial
measures which include the authority to hold, seize, quarantine, treat, apply
other remedial measures to, destroy, or otherwise dispose of regulated
materials.”138 Absent from this list is anything relating to permitting or
notification of regulated articles or noxious weeds, indicating that permitting
and notification are not tools to “prevent the dissemination” of plant pests or
noxious weeds.
Therefore, given the language of the preemption provision, the
generalized permitting and notification procedures for plant pests and
noxious weeds in the regulations, and APHIS’s case-by-case, plant-specific
measures that could rise to the level of “preventing dissemination,” it is only
stringent, plant-specific measures (such as serious quarantines) that could
satisfy this third clause of the preemption provision.
In sum, none of the three required prerequisites for express preemption
under the PPA are met in the GE crop ban context. Because all three must
be met, as discussed above, there is no express preemption.

C. PPA Implied Preemption Analysis
Congressional intent, though manifest in express preemption clauses,
may also exist implicitly in the body of the statutory language. As noted
above, there are two primary ways in which federal laws may implicitly
preempt state laws: (1) field preemption and (2) conflict preemption. In the
case of the PPA, however, the doctrine of implied preemption has little, if
any, applicability. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that when “Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that
issue,” and that provision provides a “reliable indicium of congressional
intent” with respect to state authority, there is “no need to infer congressional
intent to preempt state laws from the substantive provisions of the
legislation.”139 Later, the Court explained that Cipollone did not “obviate the
need for analysis of an individual statute’s preemptive effects,” and an express
preemption clause does not “entirely foreclose[] any possibility of implied

138. APHIS Policy on Responding to Low-Level Presence of Genetically Engineered Plant
Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,649, 14,651 (Mar. 29, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 340) (stating
that remedial measures would be assessed on a case-by-case basis).
139. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).

MURPHY_FINAL EDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE)

522

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

8/27/2015 11:51 AM

[Vol. 49

preemption.”140 However, the Court accepted that Cipollone “supports an
inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied preemption.”141 Thus, though there is an inference that an express preemption
clause forecloses implied preemption, a court might conduct a field or conflict
preemption analysis in a statute containing an express preemption clause.
1. Field Preemption
The hallmark of field preemption is the federal occupation of an entire
field of regulation.142 Congressional intent to preempt state law in a field may
be inferred when “the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress ‘left no room’
for supplementary state regulation.”143 The existence of federal law in a field,
however, does not mean that every federal statute overrides all state law in a
related area of law.144
Preemption of a whole field can also be inferred where the field is one
in which “the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”145
However, a field is not preempted merely because the state and federal laws
in questions may have different objectives.146
The PPA provides for the federal regulation of plant pests and noxious
weeds in a field designed to restrict and control the interstate movement and
dissemination of those items.147 Regulations enacted pursuant to the PPA
provide guidance for those seeking to introduce regulated articles, which may
include some GE crops.148 Taken together, the statutory text and regulations

140. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288–89 (1995).
141. See id. at 289.
142. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992).
143. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
144. Id. at 717–22 (holding that despite comprehensive federal regulations, county ordinances
requiring hepatitis screening and breath-analysis for presence of alcohol in donor’s blood were not
preempted as there was lack of Congressional intent to preempt).
145. Id. at 713 (citation omitted); see alsoHines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63, 74 (1941)
(noting the importance of the federal government in the field of foreign affairs and holding that
federal law requiring registration of aliens precluded enforcement of state law mandating
registration in state).
146. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (“The test of
whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is
whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the
field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives.”).
147. See Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).
148. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.1, 340.3, 340.4 (2014).
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allow APHIS to operate in a field concerning plant pests, noxious weeds, and
regulated articles (which, as described above, include GE organisms that are
“presumptive” plant pests because they were engineered with the use of
organisms that are themselves plant pests). A state ban on GE crop
cultivation, however, would operate in the field of GE crop regulation.
Therefore, the question becomes whether Congress intended the PPA to
exclusively occupy the entire field of GE crop regulation.
Numerous factors support the conclusion that it did not. The absence
of any language regarding genetically engineered crops in the PPA itself, the
inherently local nature of a GE crop ban, the existence of the PPA’s express
preemption clause and its exceptions, the nature of APHIS’s PPA
regulations, and the existence of state and county law in this field show that
the PPA left room for supplementary state regulation. This lack of
pervasiveness in the field allows states to maintain authority to regulate plant
pests, noxious weeds, and regulated articles. Further, if a state ban on
genetically engineered crops did not apply to actual plant pests or noxious
weeds, it would not even fall within the same “field” as the PPA.
a. Historic Police Powers of the States

Preemption analyses begin with the assumption that “‘the historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”149 This assumption is
especially forceful “when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally
occupied by the states.”150
The protection of public health, safety, and welfare is a traditional
police power of the states, including protection of the local environment.151

149. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S 218, 230 (1947)). Note that the presumption against preemption also applies in the
express preemption context. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)
(applying presumption against preemption in reading FIFRA’s express preemption section).
150. Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)); see also Bates, 544 U.S. at
449 (“[I]n areas of traditional state regulation, [courts] assume that a federal statute has not
supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intentional clear and manifest.”).
151. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485; Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605–06
(1990); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 362 U.S. 440, 442–
43 (1960) (listing cases supporting that states may legislate using their police powers in many areas
concurrently with the federal government, and explaining that legislation designed to rid the air of
pollution clearly lies within those powers). There are many state and local laws passed pursuant to
such powers, including ones to “to protect humans and the environment from the potential for
significant adverse effects of [GE] releases.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 18F.01 (West 2015). See also
MARIN CNTY., CAL., CODE § 6.92.010 (2004) (“The people of the county of Marin, desiring to
protect our agricultural industry, our natural environment, the private property rights of our
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GE crop bans—which are aimed at protecting citizens from genetic
contamination and exposure to pesticides, among others—fit neatly into this
category. Even the more specific subject of plant quarantine and disease
control has traditionally existed within the realm of state police power. States
have customarily been free to adopt measures to control the spread of plant
disease that conform to local conditions, so long as state law does not conflict
with federal authority.152 This power traces back to sentiments of Chief
Justice Marshall. He noted in Gibbons v. Ogden that inspection laws were part
of the following:
[The] immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the
territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all which
can be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves. Inspection
laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description . . . are component
parts of this mass. . . . No direct general power over these objects is
granted to Congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to state
legislation. If the legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must
be for national purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given
for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is
expressly given.153

The deference given to state regulation in accordance with traditional
police powers supports the point that federal law in this field cannot preempt
state law unless Congress explicitly made clear that this was the purpose of
the PPA. As explained below, this is not the case.
b. Relation Between Express Preemption Clause and Its
Exceptions, and Field Preemption

The PPA’s text shows that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire
field of plant pest and noxious weed regulation, much less GE crop
regulation. The scope of congressional intent to regulate is best evidenced by
the PPA’s preemption clause. As discussed above, express preemption clauses
can generally be considered a “reliable indicium of congressional intent with

citizens, and the health, safety and welfare of our people, deem it advisable and appropriate to
restrict the cultivation of genetically modified crops, livestock, and other organisms in our county.”).
152. See Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 406 (1913) (“[T]he power of the State to take steps
to prevent the introduction or spread of disease, although interstate and foreign commerce are
involved (subject to the paramount authority of Congress if it decides to assume control), is beyond
question.”) (citation omitted).
153. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203–04 (1824). See also Guam Fresh, Inc. v. Ada, 849 F.2d 436,
437–40 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that Congress had amended the Plant Quarantine Act to clarify that
states are not preempted from establishing quarantines unless the subject of state quarantine is
“specifically interdicted by a federal quarantine,” and upholding Guam’s quarantine on imported
produce, which called for inspecting produce and seizing infested produce).
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respect to state authority.”154 Thus, in addition to the reasonable inference
that the existence of an express preemption clause means that Congress did
not intend to impliedly preempt state action in a field, the language of the
PPA’s express preemption provision itself leaves room for states to regulate.
First, the PPA’s express preemption section makes no mention
whatsoever of GE crops. Second, as explained in the express preemption
section above, states are only restricted from regulating actual plant pests and
actual noxious weeds in “interstate commerce” if they have passed laws for
the purpose of controlling plants or other articles because they are plant pests
or noxious weeds, and if the Secretary has issued an order or regulation to
prevent the dissemination of the particular plant pest or noxious weed. This
means that states may pass laws that are not aimed at controlling plant pests
or noxious weeds in interstate commerce; and states may also pass laws
regarding articles that the Secretary has not addressed in a particular way.
This supplementary room, left for state regulation, illustrates that Congress
did not intend to occupy the field. In fact, governmental entities have been
progressively enacting GE crop bans or regulation without protest from
either APHIS or Congress.155
Third, the two exceptions to the PPA’s preemption clause provide
evidence that Congress intended states to retain some authority even over
actual plant pests and noxious weeds. As noted above, the “special needs”
exception allows a state or political subdivision to impose restrictions on plant
pests and noxious weeds in interstate commerce in addition to federal
regulation if it can exhibit a “special need for additional prohibitions or
restrictions based on sound scientific data or a thorough risk assessment.”156
The second exception allows for states to issue regulations paralleling the
operation of federal law.157 Under this exception, states have latitude to
operate within the field of plant pest and noxious weed regulation, despite
federal regulation in the same field. For example, Washington, Florida, and
Idaho each have state statutes prohibiting the movement and introduction of
plant pests and noxious weeds without a permit issued by a state director.158

154. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 18F.02, 18F.04, 18F.07 (West 2015); MENDOCINO CNTY.,
CAL., CODE § 10A.15.020 (2004); MARIN CNTY., CAL., CODE § 6.92.020; TRINITY CNTY., CAL.,
CODE §§ 8.25.020, 8.25.030 (2004); SANTA CRUZ CNTY., CAL., CODE §§ 7.31.010, 7.31.030
(2006); SAN JUAN CNTY., WASH., CODE § 8.26.030 (2012).
156. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(2)(B) (2012).
157. See id. § 7756(b)(2)(A).
158. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 17.24.051 (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 581.083 (West
2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-2016 (West 2015).
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Where Congress recognizes and allows the operation of state law in a field,
there should be no field preemption.159
c. PPA Regulations and Field Preemption

APHIS regulations include procedures and requirements for the
introduction of regulated articles, which include some GE crops.160 Courts
have held that federal regulations “have no less preemptive effect than
federal statutes.”161 However, congressional intent not to occupy the field of
plant pest and noxious weed regulation is evidenced by the PPA’s own
preemption clause, coupled with Congress’s silence on genetically
engineered crops entirely. This combination instructs that regulations
promulgated pursuant to the PPA should likewise not occupy the field.162
Moreover, as discussed below, the regulations themselves do not occupy the
field of GE crop regulation.
First, APHIS’s regulations in the field of plant pests, noxious weeds, and
regulated articles are geared toward addressing plant pests and noxious
weeds, not GE crops generally.163 Consistent with this, and as noted above,
GE organisms, including crops, have been regulated by several states and
localities without federal contention. Second, APHIS’s plant pest regulations
have no express preemption clause, indicating that APHIS does not intend
its oversight of regulated articles to be exclusive.164 Where noxious weeds are
concerned, there is an express preemption clause in the regulations, but it
leaves regulatory room to the states.165 Finally, the federal government has
taken the position in litigation papers that it does not occupy the field of GE

159. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009) (“‘The case for federal pre-emption is
particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field
of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever
tension there [is] between them.’”) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)).
160. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.1, 340.3, 340.4 (2014).
161. E.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1983).
162. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (explaining that
preemption by regulations must be “reasonable” and in line with what Congress would have
sanctioned); see Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985)
(“[Courts are] even more reluctant to infer pre-emption from the comprehensiveness of regulations
than from the comprehensiveness of statutes.”).
163. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 330.100, 340.0, 360.200 (2014).
164. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 574–75 (referring to Congressional silence as evidence of lack of
intent to preempt).
165. See 7 C.F.R. § 360.600 (2014) (adopting language, including exceptions, similar to the
PPA’s express preemption provision, which as explained above has limited scope). See also supra note
114 (explaining that regulations must be consistent with statute in order to preempt).

MURPHY_FINAL EDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE)

Issue 3]

SEEKING PURE FIELDS

8/27/2015 11:51 AM

527

crop regulation.166
2. Conflict Preemption
State law may also be preempted implicitly if it conflicts with federal law
either “physically” or through the obstruction of a federal purpose. A state
ban on the planting of GE crops would not violate either of these standards.
a. “Physical Impossibility” Preemption

Under physical impossibility preemption, a conflict arises when
“‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility.’”167 In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that California’s 8% standard for oil content in avocadoes did
not conflict with federal marketing orders, which attributed no importance
to oil content.168 The Court provided an example of the “physical
impossibility” test: “That would be the situation here if, for example, the
federal orders forbade the picking and marketing of any avocado testing
more than 7% oil, whi[le] the California test excluded from the State any
avocado measuring less than 8% oil content.”169 The essence of the physical
impossibility test appears to be that where it is impossible to comply with
federal and state law, the state law is invalidated. Insofar as it remains
physically possible for a person to comply with federal and state law requiring
or prohibiting some action, the state law will remain.
The PPA’s regulatory scheme would not conflict with a state GE crop
ban under the “physical impossibility” standard. Under the PPA, a person is
prohibited from moving plant pests or noxious weeds in interstate commerce
unless the person has a permit.170 Under a GE crop ban, the person would
be prohibited from planting or growing those crops. Therefore, a person
could physically comply with APHIS regulations and state law by abstaining
from cultivating the crop, and no federal permit would be required. A state
ban would not create a “physical impossibility” of complying with either the
PPA or APHIS regulations.

166. See USDA Brief, supra note 115, at 29 (“[Cross-pollination risks] can be addressed by state
and local regulations on planting.”).
167. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
168. 373 U.S. at 143, 146, 152.
169. Id. at 143.
170. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7711, 7712 (2012); 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.3, 340.4, 360.300
(2014).
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b. “Obstacle” Preemption

Under obstacle preemption, a state law is preempted when it “stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”171 This “obstacle” may go by the name of
“‘conflicting; contrary to; . . . repugnance; difference; irreconcilability;
inconsistency; violation; curtailment; . . . interference,’ or the like.”172 Under
obstacle preemption, a state law may conflict with federal law even if it is
physically possible for a person to comply with both.173
Though a federal agency may weigh in on the extent to which a state
law impedes the achievement of a federal purpose in the regulatory statute
in question, it “ha[s] no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption
absent delegation by Congress.”174 Thus, a court will not defer to an agency’s
“conclusion” that state law is preempted, but it will “attend[] to [an] agency’s
explanation of how state law affects the regulatory scheme.”175 The court
looks to the “thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness” of the agency’s
explanation of the state law’s impact on the federal scheme to determine how
much weight to accord to the agency.176
Congressional intent, as with any preemption analysis, is the starting
point for determining whether a state ban on GE crops interferes with the
“full purposes and objectives” of the PPA.177 The PPA itself posits a
congressional desire to prevent the harms caused by plant pests and noxious
weeds within the United States.178 It first calls for “the detection, control,
171. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
172. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines, 312 U.S.
at 67).
173. See, e.g., Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n, Inc. v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461, 470–78 (1984) (conducting an in-depth analysis of a federal statute and finding a main
purpose to be the protection of producers from coercive associations, and, therefore holding that
because the Michigan Act permitted producers’ associations to act in ways inapposite to the federal
statute, the Michigan Act constituted an obstacle to Congress’s intent).
174. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–78, 581 (2009) (rejecting the FDA’s claim in
preamble that its regulations had preemptive effect and noting that claim was at odds with evidence
of Congressional intent; the Court ultimately found respondent’s failure-to-warn tort claims were
not preempted, as they did not pose an obstacle to Congress’s purposes in the Federal Drug, Food,
and Cosmetic Act).
175. Id. at 576.
176. Id. at 577. See also Geier, 529 U.S. at 880–83 (holding petitioner’s defective design claim
was preempted, as it posed obstacle to the Department of Transportation’s avowed purpose of
encouraging variety of protective systems in fleets, and not necessarily passive restraint system such
as airbags, while also noting the thorough understanding and consistency of the Department of
Transportation’s position).
177. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565–66.
178. See Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).
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eradication, suppression, prevention, or retardation of the spread of plant
pests or noxious weeds” using methods of regulating interstate commerce
that will reduce the risk of dissemination of these organisms.179 It notes that
the United States export markets could be “severely impacted” by plant pests
or noxious weeds.180 Further, the unregulated movement of plant pests and
noxious weeds “could present an unacceptable risk of introducing or
spreading plant pests or noxious weeds” and their existence could “constitute
a threat to crops and other plants or plant products of the United States.”181
Thus, though the PPA also calls for the “smooth movement of . . . plants . . .
to the extent possible,”182 the overriding goal is to prevent harm.
The Secretary has authority to enact regulations pursuant to §§ 7711
and 7712 and, in turn, the regulations include procedures to restrict the
introduction of plant pests and noxious weeds.183 Taken together, the PPA
and APHIS regulations embody a predominant intent to protect the
“agriculture, environment, and economy of the United States” from the ill
effects of plant pests and noxious weeds.184 Nowhere does the statute or its
regulations promote GE crop development over other goals, nor call for the
unrestricted commercialization of GE crops. Instead, both the statute and its
regulations are comprised of restrictions on development and
commercialization in order to prevent plant pest harms.
Therefore, a state ban on GE crops would not present an obstacle to
the fulfillment of the “full purposes and objectives of Congress” but would
instead promote the underlying goals of the PPA.185 In other words, if a
genetically engineered crop were a plant pest or noxious weed, a ban of any
such crop would effectively prevent its dissemination and, thereby, any
harms associated with it. In this way, the state ban would work in tandem
with the structure and regulations of the PPA in approximating the same
goal.186

179. Id. § 7701(1).
180. Id. § 7701(6).
181. Id. § 7701(7)–(8).
182. Id. § 7701(5).
183. 7 C.F.R. §§ 330.200, 340.0, 360.300 (2014).
184. See Plant Protection Act § 7701(1). Accord Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 14, 152 (1963) (holding no preemption of state avocado regulation, based in part on
a finding of “but one provision” of the federal statute, which suggested any purpose to impose
federal uniformity on retail distribution).
185. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
186. See Guam Fresh, Inc. v. Ada, 849 F.2d 436, 438–39 (9th Cir. 1988). In Guam Fresh, the
Ninth Circuit upheld territorial law under the Plant Quarantine Act, stating,
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IV. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act and Preemption
A. Overview of FIFRA Regulatory Scheme
FIFRA regulates the distribution, sale, and use of pesticides within the
United States.187 The Act defines pesticide to include any substance intended
“for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest.”188 Within the
context of FIFRA, the term pest is defined as the following:
(1) [A]ny insect, rodent, nematode, fungus, weed, or (2) any other form of
terrestrial or aquatic plant or animal life or virus, bacteria, or other microorganism (except viruses, bacteria, or other micro-organisms on or in
living man or other living animals) which the Administrator declares to
be a pest under section 136w(c)(1) of this title.189

The Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is empowered to prescribe regulations to carry out FIFRA.190
1. Experimental Use Permits and Registration of Pesticides
The distribution, sale, or use of a pesticide is prohibited unless it is

This construction serves the central purpose of the statute, which is to prevent the spread
of plant pests and diseases. If states are not free to prevent infestations from being turned
away at their borders, many pests and diseases will spread to areas where they were not
formerly known. In this context, it cannot be said that the provisions of the Guam
Agricultural Law, which are designed to serve the same purpose, are in conflict with the
federal scheme.
Id.
Note that the Coordinated Framework, which was developed in part “to achieve a balance between
regulation adequate to ensure health and environmental safety while maintaining sufficient
regulatory flexibility to avoid impeding the growth of an infant [biotechnology] industry,” does not
have the force of law. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
at 23,302, 23,302–03 (June 26, 1986); see also supra note 19. It was not a Congressional enactment
with the power to preempt, and its purposes cannot override those of the PPA itself. Additionally,
the sentiment that a state ban may impede the “growth of an infant industry” should be received as
largely without merit nearly three decades since the Framework’s inception and the growth of the
biotechnology industry. Further, the Framework itself suggests that industry was not intended to
develop in isolation of concerns for public health and welfare. 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,303. Any obstacle
that would arguably stand in the way of industrial growth is intended to be weighed against its
health and environmental impacts, with “safety” identified as the Framework’s primary goal. See id.
at 23,302 (“This notice describes the comprehensive federal regulatory policy for ensuring the safety
of biotechnology research and products.”). A state ban on GE crops would therefore help to achieve
the Coordinated Framework’s purported primary goal of ensuring health and environmental safety.
187. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2012).
188. Id. § 136(u).
189. Id. § 136(t).
190. Id. § 136w(a)(1).
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permitted for experimental use following the requirements laid out in 7
U.S.C. § 136c, or the pesticide has been federally registered following the
requirements found in § 136a. Generally, an experimental use permit (EUP)
is required to conduct experiments, including field testing, using any
unregistered pesticide, including for the purpose of gathering data prior to
the pesticide’s registration under § 136a.191 Further, EPA may require an
EUP for the testing of a registered pesticide being tested for an unregistered
use.192 To be granted an EUP, an applicant must supply the EPA with
information regarding the designation of the pest organism(s) involved, the
amount of pesticide product proposed for use, the results of any prior toxicity
testing, and other general information about the applicant and the risks
involved.193 The EPA then determines whether the conditions under FIFRA
have been met and may grant a permit subject to whatever limitations EPA
deems necessary.194 Small-scale tests, such as some limited to less than ten
acres or conducted on a “cumulative total of no more than 1 surface acre of
water per pest” do not require an EUP.195
After completing any required field tests conducted under an EUP, a
person must submit an application to the Administrator in order to register
a previously unregistered pesticide.196 The application must include a
statement noting the name of the pesticide, a copy of the label for the
pesticide, directions for its use, the complete formula of the pesticide, as well
as various details concerning the pesticide’s use.197 Based on the application,
EPA will register a pesticide if, among other things, the pesticide meets the
appropriate labeling requirements and “will not generally cause
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”198 EPA may classify the
pesticide as being for either general or restricted use, or both, depending on
the pesticide’s contents and proposed uses.199

191. Id. §136c(a); see also 40 C.F.R. § 172.3(a) (2014).
192. 40 C.F.R. § 172.3(a).
193. See id. § 172.4 (explaining the required application contents).
194. Id. § 172.5(a).
195. Id. § 172.3(c)(1)–(2).
196. See id. §§ 152.15, 152.42, 172.3(a).
197. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act §§ 136a(c)(1)–(2) (detailing the
procedural requirements for registering a pesticide); see also 40 C.F.R. § 152.50 (explaining required
contents of application for registration of pesticide).
198. 40 C.F.R. § 152.112(e); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act §§
136a(c)(5)(B)–(C), (c)(9)(b). FIFRA defines the term environment to include “water, air, land, and all
plants and man and other animals living therein, and the interrelationships which exist among
these.” Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 136a(j).
199. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 136a(d)(1)(A)(C).
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In addition to the general registration process, EPA may conditionally
register a pesticide under certain circumstances—for instance, if the
proposed pesticide and its use are substantially similar to a currently
registered pesticide and use, or if any differences would not materially
increase risks to the environment.200 EPA may also conditionally register a
pesticide that contains “an active ingredient not contained in any currently
registered pesticide” for an amount of time sufficient to obtain the data
required for the full registration procedure.201 However, any conditional or
amended registration must not “[significantly] increase the risk of any
unreasonable adverse effect on the environment.”202
2. Plant-Incorporated Protectants
EPA utilizes its authority under FIFRA to regulate genetically
engineered organisms modified to produce “plant-incorporated protectants”
(PIPs).203 A plant-incorporated protectant is basically a pesticidal substance
that has been produced to be incorporated into (within) a plant.204 Bt
(Bacillus thuringiensis) is one of the most prominent examples of a PIP
regulated by EPA under FIFRA.205 PIPs derived through the conventional
breeding of sexually compatible plants are exempt from FIFRA requirements
(except those for adverse effects reporting).206

B. FIFRA Preemption Analysis
1. Express State Authority under FIFRA
FIFRA would not expressly preempt a state ban on GE crops because
the statute explicitly provides that states may regulate pesticides. In an
“Authority of States” provision, FIFRA leaves with states the ability to

200. Id. § 136a(c)(7)(A).
201. Id. § 136a(c)(7)(C).
202. Id. § 136a(c)(7)(A).
203. See generally Regulations under FIFRA for Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg.
37,772 (July 19, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174) (describing EPA regulation of
PIPs).
204. 40 C.F.R. § 174.3 (2014). The regulations define a plant-incorporated protectant as “a
pesticidal substance that is intended to be produced and used in a living plant, or in the produce
thereof, and the genetic material necessary for production of such a pesticidal substance,” including
“any inert ingredient contained in the plant, or produce thereof.” Id.
205. See Regulations under FIFRA for Plant Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. at 37,793
(describing genetically engineered potato, cotton, and corn Bt plants).
206. Id. at 37,777–78 (describing exemptions for conventionally bred PIPs).
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regulate the use or sale of pesticides.207 Specifically the provision explains, “A
State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or
device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not
permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.”208 State authority to
regulate pesticide labeling is limited, however, as a state cannot “impose or
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition or
different from those required under this subchapter.”209 Thus, a state
regulation would be preempted only if it permits a use or sale prohibited by
FIFRA, or creates additional or different labeling or packaging requirements.
A state ban on the planting of GE crops containing PIPs would prevent,
not permit, the use or sale of a pesticide, and would not create a labeling or
packaging requirement; therefore such a ban would not be preempted by the
federal government. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier addresses this issue.
In that case, the U.S. States Supreme Court held that FIFRA did not
preempt a local pesticide ordinance that required “a permit for the
application of any pesticide to public lands, to private lands subject to public
use, or for the aerial application of any pesticide to private lands.”210 The
ordinance gave the town board the power to grant, grant with conditions, or
deny a permit for pesticide use; the plaintiff had been granted a permit, but
the permit prohibited aerial spraying and restricted the geographic scope of
ground spraying—which was more restrictive than the uses allowed pursuant
to the pesticide’s EPA registration or label.211
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this reasoning in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences,
a case in which peanut farmers, who used an EPA-registered pesticide in
accordance with its label and suffered harms to their crops, brought common
law claims against the pesticide company.212 In fact, the Court explicitly
stated more than once that states have the authority to enact bans on
pesticide use.213 Among other things, the Court also found that “inducing” a
207. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 136v.
208. Id. § 136v(a).
209. Id. § 136v(b).
210. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 602–03, 605–06 (1991). See also
Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kauai, No. 14-00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *11 (Aug. 25,
2014) (citing Mortier, and noting that FIFRA generally lacked preemptive force).
211. See Mortier, 501 U.S. at 602–03; Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 441 (2005)
(noting that the ordinance at issue in Mortier imposed restrictions beyond the requirements of FIFRA
or any other EPA regulation).
212. Bates, 544 U.S. at 443.
213. Id. at 446 (“Under § 136v(a), a state agency may ban the sale of a pesticide if it finds, for
instance, that one of the pesticide’s label-approved uses is unsafe.”); id. at 450 (“In fact, the statute
authorizes a relatively decentralized scheme that preserves a broad role for state regulation. . . .
Most significantly, States may ban or restrict the uses of pesticides that EPA has approved, § 136v(a);
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company to change its label through a lawsuit did not amount to a
preempted labeling requirement.214
Based on the straightforward text of FIFRA’s preemption provision,
coupled with Supreme Court precedent upholding state laws and specifically
stating that states may ban the use of pesticides, state bans on the planting of
GE crops would not be expressly preempted under FIFRA.215
2. FIFRA and Implied Preemption
The implied preemption analysis under FIFRA is as clear-cut as the
express preemption analysis: preemption simply does not apply. The
Supreme Court held in Mortier that FIFRA also does not impliedly preempt
state action regarding pesticides.216 It noted that field preemption could not
be inferred, relying on the language of § 136v itself and on the fact that
“FIRFA . . . leaves substantial portions of the field vacant.”217 In particular,
the Court found the following:
[FIFRA] certainly does not equate registration and labeling requirements
with a general approval to apply pesticides throughout the Nation
without regard to regional and local factors like climate, population,

they may also register, subject to certain restrictions, pesticides for uses beyond those approved by
EPA, § 136v(c).”) (citation omitted).
214. Id. at 445–46. The Court held that claims such as strict liability and negligence were not
preempted, and that actual fraud and failure-to-warn claims would not be preempted if they were
based on state requirements that were equivalent to FIFRA’s misbranding standards, even if not
identical. Id. at 442–54. A 2002 case from the Northern District of Illinois, In re Starlink Corn Litig.,
held that a plaintiff’s design defect case alleging cross-contamination from GE corn was actually a
failure to warn case because the action would have, in effect, required additional labeling of the GE
corn. In re Starlink Corn Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 837–38 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The court reasoned
that requiring a larger buffer zone to combat cross-pollination, or not allowing the planting of any
corn not safe for human consumption, would create a labeling requirement in addition to the 660foot buffer zone approved by the EPA. Id. at 838. However, the Starlink case was poorly reasoned
because if a court were to apply the logic of Starlink to a state ban on the planting of GE crops, it
would create a serious contradiction between the plain language of § 136v(a) (explicitly allowing
more stringent regulation of pesticide use) and the seemingly endless list of uses that could plausibly
be linked to a labeling restriction. Such a link would also nullify the Mortier court’s holding that
restrictions on use are not preempted because, like the ordinance examined in that case, a state ban
would regulate whether farmers can plant GE crops, not require changes to any pesticide labels. See
Mortier, 501 U.S. at 603–06. Furthermore, the Starlink holding runs counter to the more recent
Supreme Court opinion in Bates and its even more explicit statements about state authority. See
Bates, 544 U.S. at 442–46, 450.
215. As with the bans on GE crops mentioned above, some states already regulate pesticide
use more stringently than FIFRA. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-231b (West 2015)
(banning certain applications of pesticides on school grounds); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 94.707 (West
2015) (banning sale or use of pesticides with certain active ingredients).
216. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 616.
217. Id. at 613.

MURPHY_FINAL EDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE)

Issue 3]

8/27/2015 11:51 AM

SEEKING PURE FIELDS

535

geography, and water supply. Whatever else FIFRA may supplant, it does
not occupy the field of pesticide regulation in general or the area of local
use permitting in particular.218

The Supreme Court in Mortier also held that there was no conflict
preemption between FIFRA and the local ordinance requiring Mortier to
obtain a local pesticide permit.219 Mortier had relied upon the theory of
obstacle preemption, claiming that the local ordinance frustrated FIFRA’s
goal of coordinated state and federal regulation. The Court rejected this
argument, finding that “FIFRA does not suggest a goal of regulatory
coordination that sweeps either as exclusively or as broadly as Mortier
contends.”220 Finally, the Court rejected Mortier’s claim that FIFRA would
preempt a local law based on concerns about technical expertise and
interstate commerce.221
Thus, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected both field and conflict
preemption under FIFRA. A state law banning the growth of GE plants
(including those with PIPs) would not be impliedly preempted.222

Conclusion
State bans on GE crops should not be preempted by the PPA. The
requirements of the PPA’s express preemption provision are not met. First,
state GE crop bans will not regulate “interstate” or “in commerce.” Second,
state GE crop bans will not be passed in order to control a “plant pest or
noxious weed,” but to prevent the detrimental impacts associated with GE
crops generally, such as increased herbicide use and cross-contamination.
Third, it is unlikely that the United States Department of Agriculture will
have issued an order or regulation that applies to crops covered by a state
ban and is aimed at actually “preventing” the dissemination of a particular
plant pest or noxious weed, such as a rigorous plant-specific quarantine.

218. Id. at 613–14; see also Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1306 (4th Cir. 1992)
(“By force of the same analysis conducted by the Supreme Court in Mortier to reach the conclusion
that FIFRA does not preempt the field of regulating pesticides, expressly or by implication, we hold
that Congress also did not reveal an intent to preempt any less broadly defined field.”).
219. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 614.
220. Id. at 615.
221. Id. at 615–16 (“FIFRA provides even less indication that local ordinances must yield to
statutory purposes of promoting technical expertise or maintaining unfettered interstate
commerce.”).
222. This logic would apply to all pesticides, whether registered or not. Though section 136v
refers only to “registered pesticides,” it does not preempt state power to regulate non-registered
pesticides, either. First, there is no provision expressly preempting state regulation of non-registered
pesticides. Second, as described above, there is no implied preemption of more stringent state
regulation of pesticide use under FIFRA.
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Unless all three of these provisions are met, a state GE crop ban will not be
expressly preempted by the PPA.
There is also no implied preemption under the PPA. First, the
presumption against preemption is particularly strong when a state’s historic
police powers are implicated, as with GE crop bans. Second, the PPA and its
regulations leave room for states to regulate. Third, it is not impossible to
comply with both the PPA and a state ban. Finally, a state ban would be
consistent with—not an obstacle to—the overriding purposes of the PPA.
Similarly, under FIFRA, state bans on GE crops are permissible. The
statute’s specific provision regarding state authority expressly leaves states the
power to regulate pesticide use at least as stringently as FIFRA does. The
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized as much, and has also held that FIFRA
does not impliedly preempt state laws regarding pesticide use.
In sum, states have the right to ban genetically engineered crops within
their borders.

